I went to Beijing in 1990 with a technological delegation and spoke at the opening open seminar. The majority of Taiwanese companies’ operations in China from 1990 to 2000 were only for contract processing; it wasn’t until those companies made investments in the Yangtze River Delta that the industrial relationship underwent a significant shift.

Following the relocation of all notebook production lines to China in 2000, the Taiwan Strait Islands and China began a phase of “complementarity and competition.” Taiwan could not fulfill significant orders without the Chinese industrial base, and China could not have the current electronics supply chain without the environment created by Taiwanese businesses. But Trump has woken us up, and since then, opinions on cross-strait relations have diverged.

We need to approach these problems logically: Both the political and technological sectors have their own points of view and legitimate concerns. Additionally, there are intricate problems with semiconductors and supply systems that lie behind the G2 design. We must also recognize that China has reached a new stage with the market acting as a new force propelling its industry development with the release of the iPhone in 2007 and the Beijing Olympics in 2008.

What does Taiwan have compared to China’s TikTok? What is Taiwan’s overall strategy in light of China’s development? We would hear from the administration, and the majority of the candidates in the year-end elections have addressed these concerns. Perhaps we ought to start planning our own conferences about them.

I have frequently participated in conversations about national strategies throughout the years. And I did recently present a public lecture on Taiwan’s national policy from the viewpoint of a seasoned IT sector analyst.


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